1. What happens if an injured child’s parents are separated and he spends time with each of them? What if both parents live in unsuitable properties?  Is he entitled to damages to fund the purchase and adaptation of two homes? Can he do so with an interim payment? These were the issues in a contested hearing before Master Stevens, judgment 20 July 2026.

2. The claimant is nearly 8. He suffered a hypoxic ischaemic brain injury at birth as a result of the defendant’s admitted negligence.  He has learning and behavioural difficulties and some motor impairment and although very mobile is agreed to require either single floor accommodation or at least to have his bedroom and bathroom downstairs.  He spends time with both parents, roughly 60/40 between mother and father.  The extent of his impairment is such that the claim will have to be stayed for at least another two years until he is 10 before his prognosis and care needs become clearer.  A trial would not be until he is about 12 at the earliest.  It is possible that a longer stay will be required. Both parties agreed that his current accommodation both with mother and father is unsuitable.

3. The defendant was prepared to concede a significant interim payment to fund the purchase of a forever home where the claimant could live with his mother. If alternative accommodation was required so that the claimant could continue to spend time with his father than the defendant argued that this should be rented rather than purchased.

4. The claimant’s position was that where a trial will not be for at least four years and may not in fact take place until he is 16 or older – because of uncertainty over whether behavioural issues will give rise to a need for doubled up care – it makes more sense to purchase two homes now and then sell one of them at the end of childhood than to purchase only one and rent another. If a second home is to be purchased and used during the claimant’s childhood it makes much more sense to purchase that property now than to wait four or more years and rent in the meantime.

5. The application for a further interim payment of £2.9m in addition to just over £300,000 already received was made on the basis that the further sum would be within  Eeles 1 and if not then the need to purchase two properties justified an award under Eeles 2.

Clinical negligence specialists Anthony Searle and Allegra Enefer analyse the Supreme Court’s landmark ruling on lost years damages for infant claimants in the case of CCC v Sheffield Teaching Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust [2026] UKSC 5.

Introduction

On 18 February 2026, the Supreme Court allowed CCC’s appeal by a majority of four to one: [2026] UKSC 5, at [64], [150]–[151], and [163]. Croke v Wiseman [1982] 1 WLR 71 — the Court of Appeal authority that had, for forty-four years, barred lost years damages for young children — is overruled. The case is remitted to Ritchie J for assessment of the lost years claim.

The result had been widely anticipated. What matters for practitioners is not just the outcome but how the Court got there, what it left unanswered, and what the decision means for future cases.

Clinical negligence specialist Anthony Searle analyses a recent decision on pleading deficiencies, expert evidence missteps, and costs consequences

Introduction

In Read v North Middlesex Hospital Trust [2025] EWHC 1603 (KB), Master Thornett delivered a judgment that should make clinical negligence practitioners pause. The case offers a triple warning for those undertaking claimant work:

1. Inadequately particularised claims that lack a counterfactual causation case will not survive.
2. Expert evidence must come from the right disciplines and must be obtained prior to serving pleadings.
3. QOCS protection is no shield for substantively unviable claims.

The decision illustrates how failures at every stage — from expert instruction to pleading to compliance with unless orders – can culminate in both strike out and the disapplication of QOCS, exposing claimants to adverse costs orders. This blog post analyses the judgment and offers practical guidance for claimant and defendant practitioners alike.

The ratio of the decision in AXO v CICA [2024] EWCA Civ 226 is that in certain circumstances, there is overlap and double recovery of a CICA award and Convention damages for breach of the HRA, so that it is open to CICA to seek repayment from HRA damages of a CICA award.

The decision can be read here and it is important for two reasons.

The first is practical. Damages for breach of Art 2 are typically (and were in this case) £10,000 to each person bereaved. The CICA bereavement award is £5,500.

CICA bereavement awards can be made quickly following an unlawful killing. Settlement of litigation takes much, much longer and is costly. This decision has obvious proportionality and costs consequences.

The second is legal learning. Whipple LJ’s detailed decision provides a comprehensive explanation of what CICA awards arising out of a death are for, and the purpose of HRA damages.

Perhaps the key take away comes from Underhill LJ’s single paragraph judgment, where he drew attention to damages for injury to feelings under the Equality Act 2010, and explained that:

“UK lawyers can sometimes be led by the unfamiliarity of the term “moral damage” into thinking that the European Court of Human Rights awards compensation for non-pecuniary loss on a fundamentally different basis from that adopted domestically. But the passages which Whipple LJ cites from Varnava (paragraph [103] above) and from the Presidential Practice Direction (paragraph [105] above) show that that is not the case.”

Introduction

1. 1. The approach to causation in clinical negligence cases has changed significantly over the past 20 years. In this article I consider whether as practitioners we are about to see another significant step forward or whether in practical terms little has changed.

Life before Bailey

1. 2. Before Bailey v. MoD, most clinical negligence practitioners thought that satisfying traditional ‘but for’ causation was a requirement for a successful claim. In a case where there had been a negligent five minute delay in delivering a baby but there would still have been an injury in an event a claim would be assumed to fail because the claimant could not prove how much damage had been caused by the breach of duty.

1. 3. Bailey was followed by a sea-change in practice with successful claims being brought in circumstances where it could be proved that the breach of duty had materially i.e. more than negligibly, contributed to the outcome. Many practitioners will recall some surprise at the decision in Bailey because we could immediately see that it would open the door to many more clinical negligence claims, particularly obstetric claims.  Would the door be shut again we wondered?  Academics meanwhile thought the only surprise was that material contribution had not been applied more quickly by practitioners to clinical negligence cases, seeing no basis for distinguishing clinical negligence cases from other personal injury claims.